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 2 opportunities, Constraints 
and Dilemmas in Libya’s 
Search for Justice
Jan Michiel Otto
2.1 Two Libya’s
Before discussing Libya’s justice challenges, they need to be put into con-
text. But into which context? After five trips to Libya in 2012-2013, numerous 
conversations with Libyans, and as a regular reader of the reliable on-line 
newspaper Libya Herald, I could sketch two different contexts, two compet-
ing images of Libya. 
There is, as one judge put it, “the Libya I dreamt of on 17 February 2011.” 
This is a Libya of hopes, a country where the people managed to oust the 
dictator Gaddafi and embarked on a democratic and law-based road ahead. 
Indeed, a self-appointed National Transitional Council (ntc) and a tran-
sitional government led the country throughout 2011 until the summer of 
2012. In July, free and fair elections were held resulting in a new, legitimate 
parliament, the General National Council (gnc). In the autumn of 2012, the 
government under Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was established. This new 
Libya allows for a free press. It has secured its national income, mainly from 
oil production, and is now addressing the next challenges, one by one, with 
broad support from the international community.
This hopeful Libya is reflected in peaceful appearances of everyday 
life in Tripoli, Benghazi and other towns. As ajidil researchers, whether 
Libyan, British or Dutch, we could indeed see this Libya every day, in the 
streets, parks, shops, coffeehouses, schools, universities, offices, airports. 
We saw normal life everywhere: people chatting, eating and drinking, 
working, going to the busy markets, buying and selling, driving around in 
cars, attending weddings, visiting social and cultural events, watching tv, 
and making jokes. Meanwhile in the media we were hearing and reading 
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news about the expansion and training of security forces, foreign investors 
returning to Libya, 1 and a supportive international community (see 3.1). 2 So 
it seems that for the silent majority of Libyans the present and future look 
promising, even though, sometimes, there may be problems.
There is another, more troubling Libya, in which militias operate outside 
state control and put themselves above the law, frustrating the state’s law 
enforcement, a country startled by assassinations, assaults, kidnappings, 
tortures in illegal prisons, bombs detonated at police stations and embas-
sies, usually without any of the perpetrators being brought to justice. In this 
troubling Libya every now and then armed conflicts flare up.	3 Vast areas of 
this immense country are beyond state control, especially in the deserts 
and mountains in the south.	4 Amongst the main cities Benghazi has been 
the scene of many violent attacks.	5
Troubling Libya seems a country in turmoil. In the wake of Gaddafi’s 
regime, which had scarred so many people’s lives, the 2011 uprising brought 
liberation. However, soon social and political cleavages and conflicts 
became visible. While the government makes serious attempts to improve 
the situation, the young judge’s dream of 17 February 2011 still seems 
remote.
In the headlines of Libya’s free press both sides are reflected. However, 
readers of the foreign press are mainly informed about Libya’s troubles. 
This chapter could perhaps restore the balance, as it first discusses some 
of the current hopes and opportunities, followed by some of the problems 
and constraints.
This mixed picture forms the real, complicated context of any effort 
towards good governance, rule of law and access to justice in Libya. There 
are no shortcuts to progress. The main requirements are now stabilisation 
and security, a long-term commitment to the democratic ideals of the 17th 
1	 “Libyan	Minister	of	Economy	expects	$1	trillion	in	FDI.”	Libya Herald	3	May	2013,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-001,	
accessed	on	27	June	2013.
2	 “Obama	meets	with	Libya’s	new	leader,”	Jennifer	Epstein.	Politico	13	March	2013,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-002,	
accessed	on	28	June	2013;	“Zeidan	looks	to	UAE	for	police	and	security	expertise,”	Hadi	Fornaji.	Libya Herald	28	
March	2013,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-003,	accessed	on	28	June	2013.
3	 “Fresh	deadly	clashes	in	Mizdah;	army	moves	in.”	Libya Herald	3	March	2013,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-004,	
accessed	on	27	June	2013;	“Gunmen	kill	six	Libyan	soldiers	at	checkpoint	near	Sirte.”	Reuters	25	June	2013,	
http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-005,	accessed	on	28	June	2013.
4	 “The	other	frontier	warriors,”	Beata	Oleksy.	Libya Herald	13	January	2013,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-006,	accessed	
on	27	June	2013.	
5	 “Twenty-five	reported	dead	in	clashes	in	Libyan	Benghazi,”	Feras	Bosalum.	Reuters	8	June	2013,	
http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-007,	accessed	on	27	June	2013;	“Huge	explosion	flattens	Benghazi	police	station	–	no	
casualties	reported,”	Maha	Ellawati	and	Ayman	Amzein.	Libya Herald	19	June	2013,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-008,	
accessed	on	26	June	2013.
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February Revolution, a comprehensive understanding of the problematic 
context, and substantial efforts to facilitate well-informed discussion, dia-
logue, and decision-making. In all this, the roles of Libyan individuals and 
groups are decisive. The role of the international community is limited and 
can only be effective if it is willing to learn about Libya, about its society 
and state, about its ambitions, difficulties, dilemmas, and opportunities.
2.2 Hopes, Opportunities, and Some “Good News” 
To what extent is the environment in Libya conducive to strengthening the 
rule of law and improving access to justice?
2.2.1	 Gaddafi	and	his	regime	have	gone
The death of Gaddafi put a final end to a regime, which was totalitar-
ian in nature, whimsical in operation, and ruthless towards its oppo-
nents and other victims. After 42 years of suppression, since late 2011 peo-
ple have tasted a new freedom to speak, without the old fear of being over-
heard, reported or tapped by their government. People no longer need to 
be afraid when they walk or drive past a state security agency. Gaddafi’s 
regime, which provided the grounds for many fears – for common people 
to be arrested (see Chapter 9), for critical students to be publicly hanged or 
for young women to be sexually assaulted by Gaddafi in his headquarters 
(Hilsum 2012, 64, 67, 78-79) – is no more.
There may be certain other fears, for other groups (see 2.3.1), but the 
long collective nightmare created and maintained by Gaddafi, his inner 
circle and his wider circle of henchmen and helpers, has come to an end. 
Many of Gaddafi’s men have fled the country, and are in Egypt, Tunisia, or 
elsewhere (unhcr 2013). Gaddafi’s heir, Saif al-Islam, and his closest associ-
ate Abdullah Sanusi, are imprisoned and awaiting trial.
In the wake of the 17th February Revolution, social and political groups in 
Libya have called for special legislation to prevent Gaddafi’s top and middle 
elite, and his staunch supporters, from occupying any meaningful positions 
in the new state of Libya. Indeed, several vetting mechanisms have been 
established. In April 2012 the ntc enacted Regulation 26 establishing a High 
Commission for the Application of Standards of Integrity and Patriotism – 
now commonly referred to as “the Integrity Commission” – for incumbents 
of, or candidates for, public office. This quasi-judicial commission has the 
mandate to investigate any person occupying or seeking high public office 
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for close ties with the Gaddafi regime or for criminal deeds. It has made 
numerous decisions based on the close scrutiny of personal files. The law 
allowed those affected by the commission’s decisions to launch an appeal 
with the regular courts (see 5.1).	6
Just over a year later, in May 2013 the gnc passed Law 13/2013, the 
much-contested Political Isolation Law. Its purpose was similar to that of 
Regulation 26/2012 but it went much further. Amidst pressure from armed 
militias and political factions, the gnc’s majority agreed to formulate cate-
gories that targeted anybody who had worked in a leading position for the 
Gaddafi regime since 1969. This would include many politicians with highly 
respectable, anti-Gaddafi credentials. The most conspicuous example is the 
gnc-president and de facto head of state Mohammed Megarief, who had to 
step down. With regard to vetting the judicial system, in the autumn of 2012 
a draft law on judicial reform was proposed by the Supreme Council for the 
Judiciary. It envisaged a radical purge but has not yet been accepted. Some 
observers expect that the Political Isolation Law will be used to purge the 
judiciary.
The standards and procedures for transitional justice are contested 
by different political factions. Yet, there seems to be a broadly shared 
desire that now that Gaddafi has gone, those who misused the state and 
oppressed the people on his behalf will also be excluded from leadership 
positions in the new Libya. 
2.2.2	 The	war	came	to	an	end
From February until August 2011 Libya was in a state of war, fought between 
revolutionaries and Gaddafi’s army and supporters. The struggle left thou-
sands dead.	7 On 19-20 March 2011 Benghazi narrowly escaped being over-
taken and possibly destroyed by Gaddafi’s army; brave Libyan pilots and 
later French warplanes came to its rescue. However, Gaddafi’s troops 
inflicted heavy damage on the city of Misrata, a centre of resistance. Later, 
in revenge, revolutionaries destroyed much of Sirte, Gaddafi’s “home town,” 
6	 “Inside	the	Commission	for	Integrity	and	Patriotism,”	Mathieu	Galtier.	Libya Herald	11	April	2013,	
http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-009,	accessed	on	28	June	2013.
7	 Estimates	differ	dramatically.	After	the	first	four	months	of	fighting,	the	UN	Human	Rights	Commissioner,	Cherif	
Bassiouni	estimated	that	between	10,000	and	15,000	people	had	been	killed	(“Up	to	15,000	killed	in	Libya	war:	
U.N.	rights	expert.”	Reuters	9	June	2011,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-010,	accessed	on	26	June	2013).	More	recently,	
the	National	Transitional	Council	estimated	that	“4,700	rebel	supporters	died	and	2,100	are	missing,	with	
unconfirmed	similar	casualty	figures	on	the	opposing	side”	(“Libyan	revolution	casualties	lower	than	expected,	
says	new	government,”	Ian	Black.	Guardian	8	January	2013,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-011,	accessed	on	28	June	
2013.
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as well as Tawergha, the home to a community also regarded as loyal to 
Gaddafi.
On 23 October 2011, after Tripoli had been taken by revolutionaries and 
Gaddafi was finally spotted and killed, the ntc chairman Mustafa Abdel Jalil 
declared that the war had come to an end. Local, sometimes serious, con-
flicts remained. Group violence did not disappear. There are also reports 
of actions and threats by organised terrorist groups in the south and in the 
east. Nevertheless, as we write this report in early July 2013, there are no 
signs that large-scale conflict is likely to break out again any time soon. The 
war, indeed, came to an end.
2.2.3	 New	national	unity,	a	civic	sense	and	a	civil	society	
The first half of 2012 saw many people in Libya in a state of euphoria about 
what they perceived as a new sense of national unity. People in the west of 
the country were grateful to those in the east for having started the upris-
ing. Easterners felt that an end had come to the neglect of their region by 
the central government. Armed brigades from different towns were working 
together towards the same goal. To the surprise of many people, for months 
there was a low crime rate, although most of the security forces had col-
lapsed and the country was flooded with weapons. In fact, ordinary people 
all over Libya filled the security gap in their neighbourhoods. Many felt that 
they could finally fulfil a civic duty for their country. During 2012 numerous 
civil society organisations were established. Some focus on helping victims 
of the Gaddafi regime, others on problems caused by the civil war. Others 
again advocate the rights of women, children, or ethnic minorities. Some 
civil society institutions have also organised major demonstrations to pro-
test against the militias. The development of an active civil society has been 
supported by government policy, and ngos have, in many cases, become a 
vehicle for policy initiatives.
2.2.4	Basics	of	democracy
Since early 2011 at the outset of the 17th February Revolution, the Libyan 
people and its new leaders have worked hard to establish a democracy, and 
their efforts have proven largely successful. The changes have encouraged 
a free press. The government has drafted regulations for local and national 
elections. In accordance with these laws, Libya was able to conduct demo-
cratic elections in 2012. They brought uncontested results, both at national 
and local levels. In the autumn of 2012 the newly elected parliament (gnc) 
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approved the formation of a new cabinet. Thus Libya provided itself with 
a democratic government, and as such created a broad basis for political 
legitimacy of its new policies and laws.  
2.2.5	 Good	government
After parliament had withheld its approval from the first pm-candidate’s 
proposed cabinet, the next candidate, Ali Zeidan, was more successful. 
Since the inauguration of this cabinet on 14 November 2012, the govern-
ment has faced many difficulties and potential crises but so far it seems 
to have addressed them with remarkable determination and persistence. 
Zeidan’s selection of ministers was made under high pressure from certain 
cities, parties, tribes, and other strategic groups, which demanded inclu-
sion of their representative(s). So far, the resulting cabinet has seemed to be 
reasonably stable. 
Faced with many political and violent attacks, the Zeidan-government 
has chosen the path of peace, patience, and domestic diplomacy. Whereas 
the gnc has at times been very unruly, the government has consistently 
demonstrated a respect for democracy, and for the parliament as an insti-
tution. Zeidan has also consistently referred to the rule of law as a founda-
tion of the new Libya.
2.2.6	 Basics	of	rule	of	law	and	legal	institutions
Upon independence, during the monarchy throughout the early 1950s, 
Libya had already established a full-fledged legal system (see Chapter 4). 
Much legislation followed models from Egypt, which had become inde-
pendent 30 years before, in 1922. Egypt had, in terms of legal development, 
taken the lead in the Arab world. Sanhuri, the great Egyptian legal drafter 
and judge (Otto 1995) had come to Libya to play a central role in the genesis 
of the new national Libyan law.
During this period, Libya’s legal profession established a reputation 
for the rule of law. More than a few judges and lawyers upheld this repu-
tation, despite the attempts of the Gaddafi regime to undermine it by set-
ting up parallel systems of “revolutionary” and “people’s” courts, politi-
cally appointed or legally unqualified judges and “people’s lawyers.” Much 
of the 2011-2012 transition, led by the ntc, was law-based. Lawyers and 
judges were in the forefront of the 2011 uprising (Hilsum 2012, 7-46), and 
contributed much to legal drafting for the new Libya. A private lawyer with 
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a record in human rights, Salah Marghani, became Zeidan’s Minister of 
Justice.
2.2.7	 Oil	money
The government also controls Libya’s vast oil revenues. The National Oil 
Cooperation (nco) and the Oil Ministry are known to be among the best-
run state institutions. By mid-2012 oil production had regained its pre-war 
level of about 1,5 million barrels a day.	8 Libya could, more than other coun-
tries in the region, afford to pay for what is needed to restore the rule of 
law. Yet, the boundaries between the Libya of hopes and the more troubled 
Libya are blurred here; oil production and transport have been disrupted 
by militias and workers, prompting Prime Minister Zeidan to state that 
“anyone who disrupts oil ports wants to fight the Libyan people.” 9 Over the 
past year, the government has needed the oil money, understandably, to 
buy its way out of problems, for example to buy stability and time by pay-
ing monthly salaries to tens of thousands of militiamen. This brings us to 
the problems Libya is facing.
2.3 Problems, Constraints, and “bad News”
To which extent and how is the environment in Libya frustrating access to 
justice and rule of law? 
2.3.1	 Armed	groups	
Among Libya’s main problems in 2013, the serious threats to the country’s 
security and stability stand out as the most pressing. A summary from the 
written press of just one day in June 2013 gives an impression of the num-
bers and types of reported security problems (see box 2).
Numerous post-revolutionary armed groups, so-called “militias” (milishiat) 
or “brigades” (kataib), have kept their arms and their power. Other armed 
groups have emerged in the space created by the security gap. To keep 
them in check, the government has followed the examples of other post-
8	 “Libya’s	oil.	Gurgle	and	splutter,”	The Economist,	8	June	2012,	accessed	on	11	July	2013.	
9	 PM	Zeidan	speaking	at	press	conference	on	Sunday	7	July	2013:	“Anyone	who	disrupts	oil	ports	wants	to	fight	the	
Libyan	people:	Zeidan.”	Libya Herald	8	July	2013,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-012,	accessed	on	11	July	2013.
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bOx 2
Morning	Headlines	Sunday	2	June	2013
 – Cyrenaica Federalists Declare Self Government on 64th Anniversary of Emirate of 
Cyrenaica Independence, Libya Herald.
 – Burqa Region Declares Itself Federal Region and Rejects Political Isolation Law, 
Alwatan.
 – ICC Rejects Libyan Trial for Said; Demanded He Be Handed Over, Libya Herald, 
Libyan News Agency.
 – Hollande: No French Military Action in Libya, News24.
 – France Hollande Says South Libya Islamists Likely Behind Embassy Attack; 
Worried by Lawless Southern Libya, Says No plans to Intervene Militarily, Would 
Need UN Mandate; Initiatives to Help Tripoli to Be Unveiled in Coming Weeks, 
Reuters.
 – Al-Kufra Area Commanding Officer Denies Social Media and Satellite Channel 
Reports of Foreign Forces Entering the South, Libyan News Agency.
 – Kufra Military Council Chief: Five Kidnapped by Chad Tebu Belong to Border 
Security Brigade Of Martyr Suleiman Bumtari, Almanara. 
 – Libya: Five Soldiers Kidnapped By Armed Group in South, Tripoli Post. 
 – Guards at Libyan Mellitah Oil Field Protest. News24. 
 – In Eyes of Niger People: Libya Turns From El Dorado Into Terrorist Threat, 
Middle East Online.
 – Libya Becomes “the New Mali” As Islamists Shift in Sahara, Reuters. 
 – Libya Rejects Neighbours’ Claims of Destabilising Region, AFP.
 – Spokesperson for Tripoli Police Directorate Denies Some Media and Social 
Media Reports About 2 Car Bombs in Dahra Area, Libyan News Agency.
 – Tawerghans Seek Support for the Return Home, Libya Herald.
 – Kidnapping of Revolutionary Walid Jumaa Shaaban, Head of Misrata Al-Huda 
Institution Security Unit, Alwatan.
 – New Government Agency Named “Force To Protect Foreign Diplomats in Libya” 
Formed, Alwatan.
 – Bani Walid Local Council Calls for Comprehensive National Reconciliation 
Among Tribes and Cities in Libya Based on the Principle of Restitution, Libyan 
News Agency.
 – Top Level Mediation Ends Tensions Between Tajoura and Misrata, Libya Herald.
 – Libya: Government Moves to Protect Southern Region, Tripoli Post.
 – Libya: New Interior Minister Takes Office, Tripoli Post.
 – Zeidan Intervention Stops Libyan Airlines’ Strike, Libya Herald. 
Source:	UNSMIL	Public	Information	&	Communication	Office
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conflict administrations, such as in drc Congo, Lebanon, and South Sudan, 
in recognising their role, incorporating them formally in a loose national 
security structure, and paying monthly salaries.	10 Meanwhile armed groups 
have at times been able to force their will on the government, parliament, 
on public servants, and on ordinary people. One now has to be careful 
about openly expressing support for the former regime. Some of the mili-
tias behave as autonomous powers within a state, arresting people, keeping 
thousands of them in prisons, torturing them. Militias may or may not be 
behind the dozens of assassinations of high-ranking police and army offi-
cers, especially in Benghazi. 11 They have also evicted whole communities 
from their homes – such as those from Tawergha, Mashashiya, Awaniyya 
and Tiji who fled from Misrata, Zawiyyat-al-Bajul – and have refused to let 
them safely return. Thus at times they can exercise control over parts of 
Libyan state and society.
The standoff between the government and the militias has also seriously 
undermined the justice system (see Annex iii). As a result, judges, prose-
cutors and police lack the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of power 
and thus cannot enforce the law. They receive threats, as do lawyers; some 
have even been killed. 12
Ironically, this lawlessness provides the militias with a perfect justifi-
cation. As long as the government cannot maintain law and order, they 
can claim that they will take on this responsibility. Libya thus suffers from 
a vicious circle of injustice and insecurity. According to the International 
Crisis Group (2013) there are two competing narratives to explain the 
vicious circle. The first is the state declaring that it cannot enforce the law 
as long as the militias keep intimidating and terrorising the law enforce-
ment apparatus and ordinary people. In the other narrative, the militias 
claim they cannot give up their positions as long as the state allows lawless-
ness and impunity, especially for the stooges of Gaddafi’s former regime.
10	 A	similar	policy	was	pursued	in	Afghanistan	after	2001	(“’Just	Don’t	Call	It	a	Militia’:	Impunity,	Militias,	
and	the	‘Afghan	Local	Police’.”	Human Rights Watch	2011,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-013,	accessed	on	
28	June	2013);	Lebanon	in	1991	(“Ex-militia	fighters	in	post-war	Lebanon,”	Dima	de	Clerck.	Accord	24,	
http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-014,	accessed	on	28	June	2013);	South	Sudan	from	2005	(“South	Sudan	army	integrates	
largest	militia.”	Sudan Tribune	10	June	2007,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-015,	accessed	on	28	June	2013);	and	the	
DRC	Congo	in	2009	(“Congo:	no	stability	in	Kivu	despite	a	rapprochement	with	Rwanda.”	ICG	(2010)).	
11	 “Few	arrests	have	been	made	for	these	attacks	and	no	prosecutions	have	been	brought.	Some	suspect	that	
many	of	the	killings	have	been	revenge	attacks	on	figures	from	the	old	regime,	while	others	believe	the	killers	are	
Qaddafi	regime	supporters	who	are,	as	they	see	it,	punishing	individuals	who	chose	to	change	sides	and	serve	the	
February	Revolution,”	in	“Another	senior	officer	murdered	in	Benghazi,”	Maha	Ellawati	and	Ahmed	Elumami. Libya 
Herald	26	June	2013,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-016,	accessed	on	29	June	2013.
12	 “Lawyers	slam	‘alarming’	growth	of	attacks	on	judiciary,”	Hadi	Fornaji.	Libya Herald	19	June	2013,	
http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-017,	accessed	on	June	28	2013;	“Derna	local	councillors	strike	in	protest	at	‘government	
inaction’	and	judge’s	murder,”	Ahmed	Elumami.	Libya Herald	18	June	2013,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-018,	accessed	
on	June	28	2013.
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2.3.2	 Institutional	weakness
In 2013 the question asked by many in Libya has been: why has the govern-
ment not yet taken the obviously necessary steps? Why haven’t we seen the 
rebuilding of a strong army, a strong bureaucracy, and legal institutions? 
Why does the government not regain the monopoly of power by negotiat-
ing a peaceful transfer of the “good” militias into the security forces?
Most observers agree that it is not because the ministers of Zeidan’s cab-
inet do not have the right intentions. However, they face huge problems 
with “getting things done.” The government seems to lack the institutional 
strength required to translate good governance into action. The bureau-
cracy seems not to be able to implement, execute, and enforce the policy 
plans and regulations of ministers and director-generals. 
Participant observers in the system have offered different explana-
tions for this institutional weakness. They often refer to Libya’s administra-
tive culture (see 2.3.3), tainted by the influence of Gaddafi’s regime and by a 
lack of productivity as a result of “the oil curse.” When probing deeper, they 
often point to aspects of Libyan society (see 2.3.4).
2.3.3	 The	influence	of	the	Gaddafi	regime	on	administrative	culture
One of the main accusations that has often been levelled against Gaddafi’s 
regime is that he weakened or even destroyed Libya’s regular state institu-
tions in order to prevent any challenge to his power. When Gaddafi came 
to power, the country’s institutions were still quite young. There was not 
much of an inherited colonial administration as the Italians (1911-1942) had 
systematically excluded Libyans from any bureaucratic and administrative 
institutions they had created (Vandewalle 2012, 41).
In the first decade of independence Libya was a federation in which 
administrative tasks were divided in a complicated way among three tiers. 
Only after 1963 when the federal experiment came to an end, could the cen-
tral government begin to build strong national institutions (ibid., 63-65); 
however this development was interrupted.
In 1969 Gaddafi staged a coup d’etat, and in 1977 he launched his Green 
Book ideology. It reflected a profound distrust of political and bureaucratic 
institutions, which he depicted as obstacles to people’s direct participation 
in political decision-making and the implementation of policies (ibid., 96). 
According to Vandewalle (ibid., 102),
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the Green Book’s central tenet is that ordinary citizens can directly manage 
the bureaucratic and administrative institutions that shape their lives, and 
devise their own solutions to economic and social problems. Hence the Green 
Book contains the essential idea of statelessness, and of people managing 
their own affairs without state institutions.
To implement his grandiose visions, Gaddafi created People’s Committees, 
replacing the regular state apparatus. The regime’s relentless persecution of 
critics installed a great sense of fear amongst the general population in par-
ticular for parallel organisations, such as the Revolutionary Committees. 
Gaddafi’s own charisma and his informal, non-institutionalised style of 
leadership “fitted perfectly with the kind of personalized politics that devel-
oped within the Jamahiriyya” (ibid., 125) (see Chapter 4 for more on the 
concept of Jamahiriyya). While Gaddafi severely and brutally punished cer-
tain persons and groups, he always awarded favours to select groups and 
tribes.
Meanwhile Gaddafi, in contrast to his principle of statelessness, brought 
all aspects of the economy under state control. Much of his Green Book 
ideology reflected a socialist ideology, modelled after the Arab Socialism 
Nasser had introduced in Egypt. The state dominated all manufacturing, 
agriculture, foreign and domestic retail trade, banking, insurance, as well as 
major services (ibid., 190). In all sectors, new bureaucracies were created, 
in which the connection between productivity and income was often very 
thin. We may assume that Libya’s big government had all the weaknesses 
characteristic of other centralised socialist bureaucracies in the Third World 
at that time: general ineffectiveness, low morale, inefficiencies, patronage, 
nepotism, and “rampant corruption” (ibid., 164).
For much of the Gaddafi period, failures were attributed to the coun-
try’s institutions and population, often voiced by Gaddafi himself in pub-
lic speeches. When in the end this lacked any credibility and the failures of 
the regime could no longer be ignored, the 2003-2010 period witnessed the 
beginning of reforms to liberalise the economy, and to roll back some of the 
regime’s failed policies and laws. Committees were established to design 
new policies, new statutes saw the light, and some noticeable changes 
raised expectations and hopes for real reform.	13 However, Gaddafi’s basic 
ideology and political style did not change, nor did most of the country’s 
malfunctioning political and administrative system.
13	 See	for	examples	of	such	reforms	Chs.	5,	8	and	9.
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In the state apparatus inherited by the present government, many offi-
cials have jobs as “sinecures,” they get a salary without having to do much 
– or sometimes any – work. Officials, who are professionally dysfunctional, 
have routinely retained their jobs and enjoyed both legal and socio-polit-
ical protection, much to the dismay of a minority of dedicated, develop-
ment-oriented officials. The new government, in an effort to clean the sys-
tem, disclosed that many officials were found to have more than one job. 
Many names appeared on two, three of four payrolls of public organisa-
tions. When pm Zeidan promoted a new national id card to the public, he 
disclosed that one person was even found to have a hundred jobs – and 
salaries.	14
The existing disconnect between productivity and income is also man-
ifest on the macro-level. Libya has a rentier economy, where budgets are 
covered by oil revenues, irrespective of performance in other sectors of the 
economy. Many ordinary Libyans feel entitled to their “fair share” of the 
country’s oil wealth, i.e. to an income, or two, provided by the state. For 
some government officials this works as a secure economic basis, to which 
they can add income from other sources. Obviously, efforts to reform such 
aspects of the civil service, meet the resistance of vested interests, and 
might weaken the silent support the government gets from its own public 
servants. 
A recent phenomenon which may also affect morale in the bureaucracy, 
is the vetting mechanism to remove “Gaddafi loyalists.” Although there are 
widely different responses to this throughout the whole state apparatus, 
many fear replacement, which contributes to a sense of uncertainty.
2.3.4	Libyan	society:	socio-political	identities,	cleavages	and	conflicts
For decades personalism, clientelism, and transactionalism have been 
dominant features of the social and politico-administrative structure 
throughout the mena region (Eickelman 1989, 2002). The proverbially strong 
tribes, clans, and families in the Arab Middle East have always been a coun-
tervailing force to the state and to its efforts to establish strong state insti-
tutions. What then are the most important socio-cultural markers in Libyan 
society?
14	 “Prime	Minister	calls	for	understanding,	promises	explanation	of	Budget,”	Sami	Zaptia.	Libya Herald	5	June	2013,	
http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-019,	accessed	on	28	June	2013.
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Libyans identify each other usually by their tribe,	15 their town (of origin), 
their region,	16 or their identity as belonging to the majority of Arabs or eth-
nic non-Arab minorities (cf. Obeidi 2001). From these social markers people 
derive much of their identity, “social capital,” and status. In contrast, being 
a migrant worker – from Egypt, Tunisia, Sub-Sahara Africa, and Asia – usu-
ally brings a low socio-economic status.
Certain tribes are associated with certain towns and regions, or with 
ethnic minorities. Over time, due to migration and urbanisation, tribal 
bonds have loosened in parts of the country. In contrast, for many in the 
east and south their tribe still plays a key role in the settlement of conflicts, 
both between individuals, families, as well as larger scale political conflict 
(see Annex ii and iii). Between particular tribes or towns there still are old, 
deeply seated differences, which flare up occasionally.
In today’s Libya, the following political markers matter: having been rev-
olutionary fighters (thuwar)	17 or related to them, or not; still being member 
of a particular revolutionary “brigade,” or not; having clearly been against 
Gaddafi’s regime during the uprising, or not; being a victim seriously 
affected by the Gaddafi-regime, or not; having been an active supporter 
of Gaddafi and his policies during a particular period, or not. Three other 
socio-political markers may also be important: having recently returned 
from abroad (“double passports”) or having stayed behind and endured 
Gaddafi’s rule in Libya; being an active member, supporter or associate of a 
political party or grouping, or not; and being linked to a particular foreign 
country, or not.
The abovementioned identity markers make people feel part of groups 
and communities, which form the present fabric of Libyan society. Below 
a shared Libyan identity we find a patchwork of identities and cleavages, 
resulting from  the complex combinations of multiple social and political 
identity markers. In practice, such divisions have often stood in the way of 
the neutrality of the bureaucracy, and of equality between citizens before 
the law.
15	 The	role	of	tribe	as	a	unit	of	social	organisation	is	allegedly	strongest	in	the	east	and	parts	of	the	south,	as	
compared	to	Tripolitania	(see	Annex	III).
16	 The	three	regions,	which	were	united	in	1951	to	create	the	State	of	Libya	are	the	west,	(also	called	Tripolitania),	
the	east	(called	Barqa in	Arabic,	or	Cyrenaeca),	and	the	south	(usually	called	Fezzan).
17	 Revolutionaries	killed	during	the	uprising	are	usually	referred	to	as	“martyrs.”
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2.3.5	 Legal	system:	dysfunctional	and	contested	parts
Laws in the new democratic Libya have been enacted, first by the ntc and 
presently the gnc. Whereas both parliaments promulgated many laws to 
regulate the political transition, the main body of legislation enacted dur-
ing Gaddafi’s regime is still in place. Some of those laws, issued to imple-
ment “The Leader’s Third Universalist Theory,” laid down in his Green 
Book, are seen as the root cause of injustices and conflict. A prime exam-
ple is Law 4/1978 on the reform of property and housing (see Chapter 8). 
Many Gaddafi-era laws are seen as detrimental to a modern market econ-
omy.	18 The business community has voiced serious complaints about the 
old-style, socialist legislation as an obstacle to their business, 19 and recently 
the governor of the central bank has denounced old legislation as hin-
drances to both domestic and foreign investment. Other Gaddafi-era laws 
have been criticised for other reasons, for example an important article 
of Marriage Law 10/1984 for contradicting the Sharia, and therefore being 
unconstitutional (see Chapter 4); or the Criminal Procedure Code, which 
according to a case study on criminal defence lawyers in this report, does 
not comply with international human rights standards of “due process” 
(see Chapter 6). 
It will be a major challenge for the new Libyan state to review the whole 
body of laws, and to reach a near consensus on which parts should be 
weeded out, and which parts should be maintained, or improved.
Libya’s judicial system itself is often criticised; important parts have not yet 
been operational again since the revolution, especially within criminal jus-
tice, and in certain parts of the country. Certain sections of the judiciary 
have been accused of collaborating with the Gaddafi regime, especially 
judges who served in the people’s courts (icg 2013, 3). Others have denied 
such allegations.
Some judges have been assassinated – most recently a prominent judge 
in Derna in mid-June 2013.	20 Prosecutors have received threats, and some 
18	 “Old	financial	laws	curtailing	progress	in	the	New	Libya,”	Umar	Khan.	Libya Herald	23	June	2013,	
http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-020,	accessed	on	28	June	2013.
19	 “Row	at	Libyan	Businessmen’s	Council	forum,”	Sami	Zaptia.	Libya Herald	16	January	2013,	
http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-021,	accessed	on	28	June	2013.	A	businessman	was	quoted	as	saying: “we	were	
expecting	some	new	announcements.	Some	new	policies	or	some	new	reforms	of	the	existing	business	laws.	How	
long	must	we	wait	for	progress?	I	am	not	surprised	that	the	business	community	is	getting	frustrated.	We	are	still	
forced	to	operate	under	the	old	socialist	laws	which	are	holding	us	back	and	time	is	passing.	How	long	must	we	
wait?”
20	 “Derna	judge	murdered	outside	courthouse,”	Ahmed	Elumami.	Libya Herald	16	June	2013,	
http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-024,	accessed	on	28	June	2013.
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have been kidnapped. As previously said, police and military officers have 
been assassinated, especially in Benghazi (see 2.3.1). This has served as a 
warning to other policemen, who consequently cannot easily confront the 
militias and other armed groups. Since the criminal justice system relies 
completely on the police for arresting suspects and enforcing judicial 
decisions, this has frustrated the investigation and adjudication of major 
crimes. For minor crimes the lower criminal courts are to some extent 
operational. Family courts, for example in Tripoli and Benghazi, function 
again as usual (see Chapter 7), though there are reports of occasional vio-
lence related to adjudication of family disputes. 21 It is unclear, though, 
whether and how this relates to the general causes of insecurity. 
2.3.6	Demand	for	federalism;	decentralisation	not	going	well
Historically, there has always been a great distance between the three 
regions that now constitute Libya. When Libya was established as an inde-
pendent state in 1951, it became a kingdom and, unsurprisingly, a federa-
tion. The formal end of Libya’s federal system in 1963 has not prevented the 
continuation of federalist thinking, notably in the Benghazi region. The 
fear of being outnumbered and discriminated against by Tripolitanians, 
in parliament and government, has not disappeared. This has been man-
ifested since the 17th February Revolution through a number of well-pub-
licised federalist gatherings, mainly in Benghazi, issuing declarations of 
“independence.”
The same argument has also emerged in conflicts about the com-
position and election of the Constitutional Assembly, which is to draft 
Libya’s new democratic constitution. On 13 March 2012, Article 30 of the 
Constitutional Declaration, which had served as the country’s interim con-
stitution since 3 August 2011, was amended. One of the provisions of this 
amendment provided that the gnc, which was soon to be elected, would 
choose a Constituent Assembly from non-members; this body was to be 
composed of 60 members “along the lines of the 60-member commis-
sion that was formed to prepare the constitution of the independence of 
Libya in the year 1951.” 22 Indeed, during the genesis of the Libyan state over 
60 years ago, the Constitutional Assembly consisted of 20 delegates from 
21	 “Misrata	lawyer	attacked.” Libya Herald 6	June	2013,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-025,	accessed	on	29	June	2013.
22	 Constitutional	Amendment	No.	1-2012,	Amending	The	Text	of	Article	30	of	the	Constitutional	Declaration	
(unofficial	translation),	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-026,	accessed	on	4	July	2013.	Draft	Constitutional	Charter	For	the	
Transitional	Stage	(original	text),	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-027,	accessed	on	4	July	2013.
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the western, 20 from the eastern, and 20 from the southern region of the 
country.
In Tripoli the word “federalism” mainly gives rise to resistance. The 
Zeidan government has spoken out in favour of a strong central govern-
ment but recently agreed to the transfer of several important state institu-
tions to Benghazi, including the National Oil Corporation, Libyan Airlines, 
Libya Company for Insurance and the Internal Investment Company.	23 
These transfers are meant to increase job opportunities and the economic 
development of Benghazi and the eastern region, and hence reduce the 
support for federalism.
Unfortunately, Libya has not yet developed an effective decentralisa-
tion policy enabling local and regional governments to establish demo-
cratic and responsive institutions, and to speed up socio-economic devel-
opment and to improve services. Several elected members of local coun-
cils have stepped down out of frustration with the lack of real responsibili-
ties, decision-making power and resources.	24 Much enthusiasm for the new 
Libya has waned since local administrators and citizens found that every-
thing still has to be decided by central government institutions, with their 
cumbersome procedures and tardy administrative practices designed dur-
ing the decades of Gaddafi’s rule.
2.3.7	 Libya	between	anxieties	and	hopes
It is appropriate to end this section with a long citation of a well-informed 
observer and actor. On 18 June 2013 Mr Tarek Mitri, Special Representative 
of the un Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support 
Mission in Libya, sent a briefing to the Security Council,	25 stating that,
The risks in Libya should not be underestimated, and by the same token, the 
opportunities should not be overlooked. Judging by the speed with which last 
year’s elections to the General National Congress took place so soon after the 
23	 “Federalists	celebrate	return	of	NOC	to	Benghazi,”	Ahmed	Ruhayem.	Libya Herald	7	June	2013,	
http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-028,	accessed	on	28	June	2013.
24	 “TLC	Deputy	Chairman	Resigns	in	Protest	over	PM	Remarks,”	Umar	Khan.	Libya Herald	26	May	
2013.	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-029,	accessed	on	28	June	2013;	“President	of	Benghazi	Local	Council	
resigns	over	‘unworkable’	conditions;	aims	fire	at	Tripoli,”	Hadi	Fornaji.	Libya Herald 16	August	2012.	
http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-030,	accessed	on	28	June	2013.	“Benghazi	local	election	results	announced—	woman	
candidate	wins	most	votes	UPDATE,”	George	Grant.	Libya Herald 21	May	2012,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-031,	
accessed	on	4	July	2013;	”Only	female	member	of	Benghazi	Local	Council	resigns,	citing	obstructionism,	
incompetence,”	Maka	Ellawati.	Libya Herald	20	November	2012,	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-032,	accessed	on	4	July	
2013.
25	 “Briefing	to	the	Security	Council	by	Special	Representative	of	the	Secretary-General	and	Head	of	UNSMIL,	Tarek	
Mitri,	18	June	2013,”	http://tinyurl.com/sjpgl-033,	accessed	on	2	July	2013.
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cessation of hostilities, we would be forgiven if we thought that the road to 
democracy was as simple as it appeared. As important as these elections may 
have been in ushering in the beginnings of a new political process and the 
building of legitimate state institutions, the Libyan people will continue to 
endure for the foreseeable future the heavy legacy bequeathed to them over 
decades of brutal rule. Managing the transition is bound therefore to be dif-
ficult. 
 
Mr. President, (…) The mood in Libya today may have changed since I last 
briefed the Council in March. Despite the gravity of some of the security and 
political developments that have taken place over the course of the last three 
months, Libyans have not lost confidence. Many of them remain unwaver-
ing in asserting the principles that underpinned their Revolution, and their 
desire to build a modern and democratic state, based on the separation of 
powers, respect for human rights and the rule of law. 
2.4 The Many Challenges of Justice 
The ajidil research project has in its first nine months recorded many dif-
ferent demands for justice. Justice is not an area about which there is 
immediate consensus in Libya, as there are many different views of what 
constitute major injustices, what are the proper standards for justice, who 
are entitled to be the legitimate guardians of justice, what remedies will 
suffice to satisfy the justice-seekers, and, last but not least, what and who 
should come first. 
The first group of injustices date back to the Gaddafi period (1969-2011), 
and have now provoked demands on the new State of Libya for compen-
sation. To begin with, we can distinguish several categories of political vic-
tims of Gaddafi’s repressive rule (see Chapter 9 and 10). Then, there is the 
strong and widespread desire to see those responsible for the Gaddafi-
era atrocities and oppression be brought to justice. Based on our observa-
tions, it is most doubtful whether a transfer of Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam 
or his Chief of Intelligence Sanusi to the International Criminal Court in 
The Hague would be understood and accepted as just by the majority of 
the Libyan people. Also, many now want to see the leading functionar-
ies on whose work the regime actually rested, ousted from their positions 
and permanently excluded from the public sphere. There are other types of 
injustices and demands inherited from the old regime. There is a huge jus-
tice problem, partly of a financial-economic nature, concerning the tens of 
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thousands of claims from former owners of property, dispossessed by Law 
4/1978 (see Chapter 8). Should the government have to restore their prop-
erty to them, or pay them compensation, and if so, should this reflect the 
spectacular rise of real estate prices over the last 40 years? Another per-
ceived collective injustice, more of a macro-political nature, is the neglect 
of the eastern region, which has called for a thorough redistribution of the 
state’s resources.
The second group of injustices were committed during the 2011 upris-
ing and its 2012-13 aftermath, partly by Gaddafi’s troops and supporters 
but increasingly also by revolutionaries, or in their name. Numerous assas-
sinations, kidnappings, assaults, cases of torture and bomb attacks have 
been committed. Until today militias have kept thousands of real and per-
ceived Gaddafi supporters in their illegal prison facilities. Then there are 
displaced communities who cannot safely return to their homes, such as 
the Tawerghans. There are women who fell victim to rape by soldiers from 
either side. Another injustice is felt by those who were removed from their 
position but felt that they did nothing wrong.
The third group of injustices needing to be addressed are “ordinary” 
family disputes regarding divorce or inheritance, “ordinary” labour dis-
putes, “ordinary” commercial disputes, “ordinary” crimes like assault, theft 
and robbery, committed by individuals or gangs, “ordinary” corruption by 
state functionaries, fatal traffic accidents caused by careless driving, “ordi-
nary” discrimination and maltreatment of religious and ethnic minori-
ties, of women, and of migrants, and so forth. They are not directly related 
to Gaddafi’s regime, or to the revolution – although on closer observation 
there are often connections.
Surveying the manifold demands for justice, from different groups and 
individuals, many of them backed by strong political, social and armed 
pressure, one cannot but conclude that the new State of Libya faces a 
gigantic task. To fulfil this task of providing justice to all, it needs both a 
working system of laws, legal institutions and processes, and a society 
which allows itself to be guided and protected by that system. 
In 2013-14, a Constitutional Assembly is expected to be formed and make 
major decisions about the make-up of that system, including the degree of 
autonomy for the regions, the organisation of the judiciary, human rights, 
the course of transitional justice, and the position of Sharia in the legal sys-
tem. Processes of political decision-making are to be supported by national 
dialogue and discussions about all these issues, facilitated by civil society 
organisations and a free press. At the same time, state and society need a 
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working justice system. This requires active performance of the judiciary, a 
build-up of the police and the administration in general, and their protec-
tion against the type of violent attacks, which have kept the criminal justice 
system in limbo.
There is little doubt that the legal system as a whole – laws, institu-
tions, and processes – needs reforms in many of its components. This 
is a challenge for the mid and long-term and obviously the government 
has not been able to address this in full. After the successful overthrow of 
Gaddafi’s regime, the government now finds itself caught between several 
fires. On the one hand there is the pressure from without: all these conflict-
ing demands for justice, dissatisfied and impatient groups and individuals, 
dangerous armed groups, an unruly parliament, and a critically watching 
international community; on the other hand, the government must deal 
with its own often ineffective bureaucracy and an old body of regulations. 
For a systematic diagnostic analysis of the legal system and how it operates 
in social reality, the Libyan government could muster the support of those 
who are trained to understand and analyse Libya’s law and society, notably 
its most qualified academics (see Chapter 12).
Given the challenging and complex environment of Libya’s justice 
issues, one may wonder what contribution the international community 
could possibly make to foster “justice and the rule of law.” During Libya’s 
first years as an independent state, in the 1950s, the un played a major and 
positive role. After Libya’s liberation in 2011, the un has again provided gen-
erous assistance through the United Nations Support Mission In Libya 
(unsmil). During 2012 and 2013 many more international actors have come 
on stage, reflecting the rapid growth of international attention for justice 
and the rule of law. In the next chapter we will look at how some of these 
actors have regarded Libya’s justice problems.
